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CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
ADDRESSING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF A 
LIABILITY INSURER’S 
BREACH OF ITS DUTY TO 
DEFEND 
  
Michael A. Haskel* 
 
Courts are sharply divided over whether liability insurers 
that breach their duty to defend insureds should be permitted 
to raise policy exclusions in defense of subsequently com-
menced litigation brought by their insureds.1  Difficulty in 
                                                          
* Attended Georgetown University Law Center, 1972-73, graduated from 
New York University, J.D., 1975, Cornell University, B.S., 1970. The author 
has been a practicing New York attorney since 1976. The author wishes to 
thank Brandon M. Zlotnick, Esq., New York University, J.D., 2002, 
University of California, Berkeley, B.A., 1995, for his contributions to this 
Article. 
1 Compare Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 184 (Alaska 1992) (“[A]n 
insurance company which wrongfully refuses to defend is liable for the judg-
ment which ensues even though the facts may ultimately demonstrate that 
no indemnity is due.”); Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 21, 26 (Conn. 1967) (“The defendant, after breaking the 
contract by its unqualified refusal to defend, should not thereafter be permit-
ted to seek the protection of that contract in avoidance of its indemnity provi-
sions.”); Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 
1134-35 (Ill. 1999) (insurer that refuses to defend insured without defending 
under a reservation of rights or seeking a declaratory judgment that there is 
no coverage, and is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage, is es-
topped from raising policy defenses to coverage); Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. 
Byars, 614 So. 2d 959, 964 (Miss. 1993) (“[W]hen an insurer breaches its duty 
to defend an insured, it is liable and bound by any settlement agreements 
made by the insured as a result of this breach.”); Newman v. Scottsdale Ins. 
Co., 301 P.3d 348, 359 (Mont. 2013) (“If an insurer unjustifiably refuses to 
defend a claim, that insurer is estopped from denying coverage.”); Pulte 
Home Corp. v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 647 S.E.2d 614, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (in-
surer that refuses to defend its insured without justification is estopped from 
denying coverage), and Radke v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 366, 
1
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resolving the thorny issue of what remedy should be imposed 
on an insurer for failing to provide an insured with a defense is 
evident in the two decisions of the New York State Court of 
Appeals in the case of K2 Investment Group, LLC v. American 
Guarantee Liability & Insurance Co.2  Although the initial 
opinion barred the carrier from raising exclusions, it was 
followed within eight months by a reversal upon reargument on 
the ground that, while there was support for its original 
decision, stare decisis should have been followed and led to the 
opposite result.  In May 2014, taking a position contrary to 
New York’s approach on reargument, the American Law 
Institute passed a Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance 
Tentative Draft No. 2, recommending that carriers that breach 
their duty to defend be precluded from contesting coverage in 
any suit against them for indemnification.3 
                                                                                                                                  
371 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (“Because Fireman’s Fund breached its duty to de-
fend, it may not now challenge or otherwise litigate the coverage issues.”), 
with, e.g., Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 
1999) (applying Missouri law and holding that an insurer liable for full 
amount of settlement, including the portion related to uncovered claims, 
would award the policyholder a windfall); Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. 
Supp. 2d 1223, 1229 (D. Colo. 1999) (applying Colorado law and stating “[A]n 
insurer is not precluded from contesting coverage when it has breached its 
obligation to defend its insured, even if such breach was in bad faith.”); Ala. 
Hosp. Ass’n Trust v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 538 So. 2d 1209, 1216 (Ala. 1989) 
(failure of insurer to defend claim against insured does not bar insurer from 
relying on exclusions on the issue of coverage); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 447 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (declining to impose es-
toppel against insurer for breach of contractual duty to defend); Polaroid 
Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 610 N.E.2d 912, 921 (Mass. 1993) (“A failure to 
defend does not bar an insurer from contesting its indemnity obligation.”); 
Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 444 
(N.Y. 1985) (“By holding the insurer liable to indemnify on the mere ‘possibil-
ity’ of coverage perceived from the face of the complaint—the standard appli-
cable to the duty to defend—the [lower] court has enlarged the bargained-for 
coverage as a penalty for breach of the duty to defend, and this it cannot 
do.”). 
2 K2 Inv. Grp., LLC. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1249 
(N.Y. 2013), rev’d in part on reargument, 6 N.E.3d 1117 (N.Y. 2014).  Haskel 
and Zlotnick represented the plaintiffs in the K2 case. 
3 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 21(1) (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, March 26, 2014) (“A liability insurer that breaches the 
duty to defend a claim loses . . . the right to contest coverage for the claim.”). 
The American Law Institute subsequently announced that it would convert 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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In pursuit of a greater understanding of this controversial 
subject, this article will: (1) explore the contract principles and 
public policy considerations that are implicated by an insurer’s 
breach of its defense duty; (2) consider recent case law 
addressing relevant issues; and (3) recommend a 
comprehensive approach that accommodates competing 
interests.  Ultimately, the author concludes that in most cir-
cumstances an insurer that wrongfully disclaims its duty to de-
fend should be precluded from raising defenses as to coverage 
in an action to indemnify the insured for monies paid out by 
the insured. 
I.  
The circumstances that are common to all cases that are 
the subject of this article include:  a liability insurance policy 
with a policy provision (“Defense Clause”) requiring defense of 
the insured against claims for indemnity arising out of acts and 
omissions constituting a claim as defined by the policy (“De-
fense Duty”); and the carrier’s violation of the Defense Clause 
(“Insurer’s Breach”) by declining to defend the insured in the 
litigation asserting such claim (“Underlying Action”). In each 
case, the Insurer’s Breach leads to the application of contract 
jurisprudence to determine the nature of the breach and the 
appropriate remedy.  The starting point is the wording of the 
policy, particularly the language constituting the Defense Du-
ty. 
Liability insurance policies define the term “claim” as en-
compassing allegations that, if true, would render the insured 
liable to the claimant for acts and omissions that fall within the 
policy’s coverage (“Basic Coverage”).  Where the facts establish 
that a claim falls within the policy’s Basic Coverage, the carrier 
must indemnify the insured unless a policy exclusion (“Exclu-
                                                                                                                                  
the “Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance” project into a “Restatement 
of the Law of Liability Insurance” project, meaning that it now should reflect 
the law in the majority of jurisdictions. It is likely that this section will be re-
vised, given that it presently reflects what is acknowledged to be a minority 
rule. However, this article takes the position that the minority rule, reflected 
in the previously approved “Principles,” is the correct one. 
3
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sion”), which is a defined exception to Basic Coverage, is proven 
by the carrier.4 
Typically, Defense Clauses impose all responsibility for de-
fense under a liability policy of insurance, upon the insurer, 
which is vested with control over the handling of the claim’s de-
fense.  The insurer’s dominance is practical because insurers 
are presumptively better experienced in dealing with the de-
fense of claims than their insureds.  In discharging its Defense 
Duty, a carrier satisfies the insured’s expectation that the car-
rier will provide protection against claims, whether meritorious 
or not, which is what the Defense Clause routinely requires.5  
The standard Defense Clause also expressly binds the insured 
to cooperate with the insurer in such defense, which is con-
sistent with the best interests of both the insurer and the in-
sured.6  The latter is obviously benefitted through the insurer’s 
assumption of the responsibility for the defense.  Often lacking 
the expertise or resources to address any claim raised against 
it, an insured is clearly favored by a carrier’s honoring its De-
fense Duty.  The insurer, too, may be served through its control 
and oversight of the defense of any claim that potentially re-
sults in an insurer’s obligation to indemnify the insured for 
claims falling within Basic Coverage.  Because of the insurer’s 
privity with its insured on issues resolved in the Underlying 
Action, the insurer will be collaterally estopped from raising 
defenses that were or could have been asserted in the Underly-
ing Action.7  Even when the carrier satisfies its Defense Duty, 
the possibility that the indemnity obligation will be triggered 
will exist, but playing a lead role in the defense of the claim can 
enable a carrier to reduce suboptimal outcomes brought about, 
for example, by inadequate legal representation or collusion be-
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 
N.E.2d 687, 692 (N.Y. 2002). 
5 See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 
1993) (policy imposing on insurer duty to defend any suit against the insured 
seeking damages payable under the policies “even if any of the allegations of 
the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent”). 
6 However, economic reasons may encourage an insurer to ignore its Defense 
Duty to its insured, depending upon the consequences of such refusal.  See 
discussion infra pp. 221-22. 
7 See, e.g., Rucaj v. Progressive Ins. Co., 797 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (App. Div. 2005); 
Matychak v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 581 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (App. Div. 1992). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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tween the insured and the party prosecuting the Underlying 
Action. 
Consistent with the purpose of vesting the insurer with 
control over the defense of claims, Defense Clauses are broadly 
written, and commonly provide the insurer with authority over 
material aspects of the defense, including the selection of coun-
sel and settlement.8  Courts have construed Defense Clauses 
expansively, imposing upon the insurer liability for failure to 
hire capable defense counsel,9 conscientiously evaluate 
claims,10 retain appropriate experts,11 and actively supervise 
the defense.12  Decisions have interpreted Defense Clauses to 
require the insurer to provide enumerated services competent-
ly, along with others necessary to implement the Defense Duty 
meaningfully.13 
A large body of decisional law extends the Defense Duty to 
any claim that might potentially fall within the policy based 
upon the pleadings in the Underlying Action.14  Although they 
                                                          
8 See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Pa. Cas. Co., 642 F. Supp. 180, 186 (D. Wyo. 
1986) (quoting insurance policy stating that “[t]he company may make such 
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient” and 
“[t]he company shall have sole and final authority to select and retain counsel 
for the defense of any insured pursuant to the company’s obligation under 
this policy”). 
9 See Sierra Pac. Indus. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-00346-MCE-JFM, 
2011 WL 2935878, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (“The duty to defend 
requires that the carrier provide competent counsel, qualified to defend the 
insured in the particular matter at issue.”). 
10 See Fredericks v. Home Indem. Co., 474 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 (App. Div. 1984) 
(holding insurer acted “in bad faith in conducting a defense when on the eve 
of trial it was still unaware of the precise amount of coverage available”). 
11 See Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 542, 567 (Wis. 
2010) (upholding jury finding of bad faith, based in part on insurer’s failure 
to retain experts, including an accident reconstructionist, who could have 
provided evidence limiting the insured’s liability to the injured party). 
12 See Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 123 F.R.D. 80, 83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (duty to defend involves “taking on the burden of decision-
making regarding litigation strategy” and “effective management of litigation 
in a multi-front liability war”), aff’d, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989). 
13 See Murphy v. Hopkins, 4 N.W.2d 801, 805 (S.D. 1942) (holding duty to de-
fend included obligation to pay expenses incurred in procuring necessary at-
tendance of witnesses).  
14 E.g., Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 329 (Ct. App. 1980); Penn-
Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 374, 376 (Ga. 1997); 
Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Danner, 967 N.E.2d 836, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); 
5
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could have, many such decisions have not discussed the actual 
language of Defense Clauses in finding a Defense Duty, which 
suggests that the parameters of the Defense Duty arise from 
public policy considerations, not simply contract language, and 
are now part of stare decisis.15  In contrast, the narrower duty 
to indemnify (“Indemnity Duty”) is limited to the payment of 
claims that actually fall within the policy, as established by the 
facts determined in the Underlying Action.16  This distinction 
has led many carriers, even while they are defending their 
insureds, to:  (i) reserve their rights to raise exclusions to 
claims; and/or (ii) commence declaratory judgment actions 
seeking judicial determinations as to whether any policy 
exclusion relieves the carriers of responsibility for the claims.  
The pursuit of one of these two options is judicially favored 
(“Favored Insurers Approach”).17  In contrast, an insurer’s 
refusal to defend its insured in the Underlying Action on the 
basis of the applicability of an exclusion, before there is a 
judicial determination of the validity of the exclusion, is a 
disfavored approach (“Disfavored Insurers Approach”)18 
(collectively, Favored Insurers Approach and Disfavored 
                                                                                                                                  
Frontier Insulation Contractors v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 690 N.E.2d 866, 868 
(N.Y. 1997). 
15 See Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Transp. Joint Agreement, 741 N.E.2d 
253, 254 (Ill. 2000) (stating, “[i]f the underlying complaints allege facts within 
or potentially within policy coverage, the insurer is obliged to defend its in-
sured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent,” without 
referencing policy language on the duty to defend). 
16 E.g., Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 773 (Cal. 1997); Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 334 S.W.3d 
217, 219 (Tex. 2011); see Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 
477 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he duty to pay is measured by the actual 
basis for the insured’s liability to a third person.”). 
17 See Lang v. Hanover Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (N.Y. 2004) (“[W]e 
note that an insurance company that disclaims in a situation where coverage 
may be arguable is well advised to seek a declaratory judgment concerning 
the duty to defend or indemnify the purported insured.”). 
18 See id. at 859 (“If [the insurance company] disclaims and declines to defend 
in the underlying lawsuit without doing so, it takes the risk that the injured 
party will obtain a judgment against the purported insured and then seek 
payment pursuant to [New York] Insurance Law § 3420. Under those 
circumstances, having chosen not to participate in the underlying lawsuit, 
the insurance carrier may litigate only the validity of its disclaimer and 
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Insurers Approach shall be referred to as an “Insurer 
Approach”). 
Although the Favored Insurers Approach reduces the pos-
sibility of certain potentially adverse outcomes to both insurers 
and insureds, insurers, based on purely economic considera-
tions, may choose to run the risk that they will lose part or all 
of their ability to defend a claim for indemnity for breach of 
their Defense Duty.  Where an insurer is guided exclusively by 
profit motive, the Insurer Approach will be based on the carri-
er’s assessment of interrelated variables that bear upon the at-
tendant risk that attaches to the carrier’s decision (“Insurer’s 
Approach Variables”).  Among these are:  (1) whether a claim-
ant is likely to prevail against the insured in the Underlying 
Action on a cause of action that falls within Basic Coverage; (2) 
whether the pleading in the Underlying Action is based on al-
legations that, in whole or in part, fall within any exclusion; (3) 
the likelihood that the carrier will prevail in proving the ap-
plicability of its exclusion; (4) the cost of defending the Under-
lying Action; (5) the cost of obtaining a resolution of the validity 
of any of the exclusions; (6) the possibility the insured will not 
bring suit for Insurer’s Breach; (7) the cost to the insurer of de-
fending an action, if brought by the insured for breach; and (8) 
the cost resulting from the resolution in the Underlying Action 
of issues against the insurer by reason of the insurer’s privity 
with the insured in the Underlying Action.19 
Insurers guided solely by the desire to maximize profits 
will engage in an analysis in which Disfavored Insurers Ap-
proach Costs will be weighed against Favored Insurers Ap-
proach Costs.  Putting aside additional adverse consequences 
imposed by any applicable jurisprudence for following Disfa-
vored Insurers Approach, a Disfavored Insurers Approach will 
be followed if Disfavored Insurers Approach Costs are per-
ceived to be less than Favored Insurers Approach Costs in any 
given case.  No doubt on some level there will be an effort to 
                                                          
19 Here, items (1), (2), and (3) are Insurer’s Approach Variables that relate to 
the likely outcome of any litigation that implicates the exclusion directly or 
indirectly.  Items (4) and (5) are associated with those expenses that follow a 
carrier’s following a Favored Insurers Approach (“Favored Insurers Approach 
Costs”).  Items (6), (7), and (8) are variables that are associated with the 
pursuit of a Disfavored Insurers Approach (“Disfavored Insurers Approach 
Costs”). 
7
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quantify the possibility that an insured will commence suit for 
an Insurer’s Breach.  This possibility will be factored into the 
insurer’s decision, viz., the Disfavored Insurers Approach Costs 
will consider the costs that would be incurred if an insured 
pursued litigation for an Insurer’s Breach.  Where the Favored 
Insurers Approach Costs are equal to Disfavored Insurers Ap-
proach Costs, without taking account of item (6) above, profit-
driven carriers will always choose a Disfavored Insurers Ap-
proach because of the significant likelihood that a number of 
insureds will not bring suit, resulting in a cost savings.  In ad-
dition, Disfavored Insurers Approach Costs have the economic 
advantage of being deferred costs, while Favored Insurers Ap-
proach Costs are incurred at an earlier point in time. 
Allan Windt observes that in the majority of jurisdictions, 
the carrier who abandons its insured can still assert an exclu-
sion in a subsequently brought action against the carrier for 
Insurers Breach.20  However, realizing the role that profit mo-
tive plays in leading to a decision that may adversely affect the 
contractual rights of insureds, a number of courts have rejected 
what the author shall refer to as the “Exclusion Survival Rule,” 
which allows a carrier that has violated its Defense Duty to 
raise exclusions in subsequently commenced litigation against 
the insurer for indemnification.21  These courts prefer a touch-
stone which provides that an Insurer’s Breach bars a carrier 
from raising policy exclusions (the “Exclusion Bar Rule”).22  
                                                          
20 See generally 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4:37, at 
4-296 to -302 (6th ed. 2013). 
21 See, e.g., Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 
1999) (applying Missouri law); Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 
1223, 1229 (D. Colo. 1999) (applying Colorado law); Ala. Hosp. Ass’n Trust v. 
Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 538 So. 2d 1209, 1216 (Ala. 1989); Hirst v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 447 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (declining to 
impose estoppel against insurer for breach of contractual duty to defend); Po-
laroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 610 N.E.2d 912, 921 (Mass. 1993); 
Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 444 
(N.Y. 1985). 
22 Illinois case law estops an insurer that has wrongfully disclaimed its duty 
to defend from raising any policy defenses to coverage.  See, e.g., Emp’rs Ins. 
of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134-35 (Ill. 1999). 
The Exclusion Bar Rule, barring the raising of exclusions, is somewhat nar-
rower than Illinois’s rule, in that it precludes only the application of policy 
exclusions, not other defenses to coverage. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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When the Exclusion Bar Rule is followed, the costs to the In-
surer of at least four items of the Insurer’s Approach Variables, 
viz., (3), (6), (7), and (8) are directly or indirectly increased, cre-
ating an incentive to follow a Favored Insurers Approach. 
Although the Exclusion Bar Rule seems the minority ap-
proach, it appears to be gaining greater acceptance, particular-
ly among legal scholars.23  The question, however, remains 
thorny, as reflected in the recent vacillation of New York’s 
Court of Appeals in the K2 case, which at first applied the Ex-
clusion Bar Rule,24 but later followed the Exclusion Survival 
Rule.25 
In general, the reasoning supporting which of these two 
rules is followed falls into three categories:  (1) contract law 
embodying the calculation of damages; (2) the judiciary’s right 
to shape appropriate remedies for the violation of judicial con-
structs; and (3) public policy.  As shall be seen, the proper 
choice between the Exclusion Bar Rule and the Exclusion Sur-
vival Rule requires a precise defining of relevant legal issues, 
followed by an application of law and public policy tailored to 
those issues.  Ultimately, this author concludes the Exclusion 




A. Contract Principles 
 
 1.  The Exclusion Survival Rule 
 
Liability insurance policies are silent on the consequences 
of the abandonment of insureds prior to the determination of 
whether an exclusion applies,26 inviting the applicability of 
contract jurisprudence to address this issue. 
                                                          
23 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 21(1) (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, March 26, 2014) (“A liability insurer that breaches the 
duty to defend a claim loses . . . the right to contest coverage for the claim.”). 
24 See K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1249, 
1254 (N.Y. 2013), rev’d in part on reargument, 6 N.E.3d 1117 (N.Y. 2014). 
25 See K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 6 N.E.3d 1117, 
1120 (N.Y. 2014). 
26 It is safe to assume that if this were otherwise, the case law would address 
this circumstance. 
9
 224 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:1 
Insurer advocates contend that the Exclusion Survival 
Rule is founded upon a well-recognized principle of compensa-
tory damages that limits awards to redressing injury proxi-
mately caused by breach of contract (“Compensatory Damages 
Principle”).  The Compensatory Damages Principle is intended 
to make whole the injured party for the resulting loss directly 
attributable to the breach, but nothing beyond, because com-
pensatory damages are meant to place the injured party in the 
position he would have been in had the wrong not occurred.27 
The application of the Compensatory Damages Principle to 
a carrier’s breach of its Defense Duty limits damage awards to 
actual losses that are occasioned by the Insurer’s Breach.  Be-
cause there is no coverage where an exclusion has been estab-
lished, the Compensatory Damages Principle has been em-
ployed to avoid carrier indemnity obligations where the actual 
facts place the loss within the exclusion.28  As explained by Al-
lan Windt, when “a contract is breached, the injured party is 
entitled to receive what would have been obtained if there had 
been no breach; the injured party is not entitled to receive 
more.”29 
The Exclusion Survival Rule is premised upon the notion 
that there is no basis for treating an Insurer’s Breach of the 
Defense Duty any differently than a breach of a non-insurance 
contract.  At the heart of holdings following the Exclusion Sur-
vival Rule30 is the conviction that “[i]f an underlying claim … is 
not within the coverage of an insurance policy, an insurer’s im-
proper failure to defend that claim would not ordinarily be a 
cause of any payment that the insured made in settlement of 
that claim (or to satisfy a judgment based on that claim).”31  
Going even further, some courts have held that imposing liabil-
                                                          
27 E.g., Taylor v. Colo. State Bank of Denver, 440 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. 1968); 
Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 913 (Mont. 1990). 
28 See, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 576 P.2d 
1244, 1248 (Or. 1978). 
29 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4:37, at 4-298 (6th 
ed. 2013). 
30 E.g., Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 447 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1984); Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 66 So. 3d 438, 452 (La. 2011); Elliott 
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1310, 1313 (Me. 1998); Polaroid Corp. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 610 N.E.2d 912, 921 (Mass. 1993). 
31 Polaroid Corp., 610 N.E.2d at 921. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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ity on a carrier for an excluded claim on the basis of a breach of 
the Defense Duty would be tantamount to a rule of “automatic” 
indemnity.32  This argument against the Exclusion Bar Rule 
contends that depriving a breaching carrier of the right to raise 
exclusions in defense of the indemnity action would award a 
policyholder a “windfall in the form of greater insurance cover-
age than [the policyholder] would have obtained had the insur-
er defended the underlying case.”33 
An ancillary issue raised in favor of the Exclusion Survival 
Rule is that the Defense Duty is broader than the Indemnity 
Duty (“Defense-Indemnity Axiom”),34 which is certainly true,35 
but the Defense-Indemnity Axiom actually highlights the 
breadth of the Defense Duty and invites consideration of 
whether there can be damages for its breach prior to a deter-
mination of an exclusion relieves the carrier of the Defense Du-
ty.   
 
 2.  The Exclusion Bar Rule 
 
  a.  The Exclusion Bar Rule and the Compensatory Dam-
ages Principle 
 
Although those courts that have followed the Exclusion 
Bar Rule have often cited factors that justify avoiding the ap-
plication of the Compensatory Damages Principle,36 the Exclu
                                                          
32 Id. at 920-21. 
33 Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1999) (ap-
plying Missouri law). 
34 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 
444 (N.Y. 1984). 
35 See id. 
36 See, e.g., Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 993 
(Conn. 2013) (insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend may not seek the 
protection of [the insurance] contract in avoidance of its indemnity 
provisions); Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 
1122, 1134-35 (Ill. 1999) (insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend, without 
defending under a reservation of rights or seeking a declaratory judgment 
that there is no duty to defend, is estopped from raising policy defenses to 
coverage); Radke v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1998) (“When an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend on the grounds 
that a claim against its insured is not within the coverage of its policy, the 
insurer cannot later contest coverage, but is liable to the insured.”). 
11
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sion Bar Rule does not offend the Compensatory Damages 
Principle, provided the Compensatory Damages Principle is 
applied with careful attention to the timing of the Insurer’s 
Breach.  Recognition that the Exclusion Bar Rule and the 
Compensatory Damages Principle may peacefully coexist in-
vites addressing the flawed assumption that if it is later de-
termined that an exclusion is valid, there can be no harm for a 
carrier’s failure to defend, because the claim was not covered in 
the first instance.  The error underlying this contention is in its 
failure to consider the period prior to the time (“Pre-Exclusion 
Resolution”) when there is a determination of the exclusion’s 
validity (“Exclusion Resolution”), which is a period when de-
fense is required.37  Even if the insurer succeeds in proving 
that an exclusion relieves it of the duty to indemnify and de-
fend an ongoing Underlying Action, any damage that occurs 
during the Pre-Exclusion Resolution period should be awarded 
to the insured given the Insurer’s Breach of the Defense Duty.  
The subsequent establishment of the validity of the exclusion 
does not retroactively eliminate those damages, nor alter their 
nature, because the damages arise from the Insurer’s Breach. 
Up until the Exclusion Resolution, unless there is a judg-
ment or an insured settlement in the Underlying Action, there 
would appear to be no damages for the Insurer Breach except 
for defense costs incurred by the insured.  This common percep-
tion is reflected in the conclusion that an Insurer’s Breach is 
“not ordinarily . . . a cause of any payment.”38  However, the 
events of a judgment against, or a settlement by, the insured 
raise the issue of whether, had the carrier defended the in-
sured, the outcome would have been different, viz., could the 
claim have been defeated if the carrier had honored its Pre-
Exclusion Resolution Defense Duty. 
The Compensatory Damages Principle is not violated by 
judicial recognition of the possibility that injury was done to 
the insured as a result of a Pre-Exclusion Resolution Insurer’s 
Breach.  By narrowing damages occasioned by the Insurer’s 
Breach to those arising Pre-Exclusion Resolution (“Pre-
                                                          
37 As discussed above, the duty to defend is triggered by the allegations in the 
pleading and by any possibility that the claim may be within the policy’s 
coverage. 
38 Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 610 N.E.2d 912, 921 (Mass. 1993). 
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Exclusion Resolution Insurer Breach Damages”), one of the ob-
stacles argued against the Exclusion Bar Rule is avoided:  the 
Compensatory Damages Principle is not sacrificed by recogni-
tion that a subsequently established exclusion is no defense to 
an award of damages actually caused by Insurer’s Breach of its 
Defense Duty.  Remaining open is how to treat proximate cause 
and quantification of damages issues.39   
Generally, courts following the Exclusion Bar Rule have 
cited the well-established rule that contracting parties are enti-
tled to the benefit of their bargain as provided in the policy.  
There is no question that the Defense Duty is part of the bene-
fit of the bargain.40  A significant component of insurance pre-
miums is dedicated to claims defense, and, in light of applicable 
law, such defense is required up until Exclusion Resolution.  
This aspect of the Defense Duty is reflected in decisions requir-
ing carriers to defend insureds if any question exists as to the 
applicability of an exclusion sought to be invoked by the carri-
er.41  No doubt aware of this feature of the Defense Duty, carri-
ers, in pursuit of good business practices, calculate the cost of 
defense as part of the premium they charge.  That part of the 
premium represents the carrier’s obligation to absorb defense 
costs incurred until there is an Exclusion Resolution only fur-
ther supports the notion that Pre-Exclusion Resolution defense 
is part of the consideration the insured pays for in payment for 
the policy, and therefore the insured has every right to expect 
to be awarded damages for any Pre-Exclusion Resolution 
breach. 
Furthermore, because carriers either collect, or have the 
opportunity to calculate and collect, premiums to address Pre-
Exclusion Resolution defense costs, the consequences of an in-
                                                          
39 These questions will be discussed below.  See infra pp. 233-34. 
40 See BP Air Conditioning Corp. v. One Beacon Ins. Grp., 821 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 
(App. Div. 2006) (“[W]here a liability policy promises defense as well as 
indemnification, ‘litigation insurance’ – even where an eventual judgment 
against an insured may not be within the scope of coverage – is an integral 
part of the benefit of the insured’s bargain.”), aff’d as modified, 871 N.E.2d 
1128 (N.Y. 2007). 
41 See Gibraltar Cas. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 574 N.E.2d 664, 675 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990) (“If an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, its 
applicability must be clear and free from doubt at the time the insurer is 
requested to defend because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in the 
insured’s favor.”). 
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surer’s Pre-Exclusion Resolution Breach are not a windfall to 
the insured; to the contrary, the retention of such premiums 
without providing a defense would be a windfall to the carrier 
in the form of unwarranted costs savings (“Unwarranted De-
fense Costs Savings”).  Intuitively, it would appear that Un-
warranted Defense Costs Savings are significant.  As noted 
above, any number of insureds who might have a claim for an 
Insurer’s Breach will not pursue these claims for a variety of 
reasons, including financial inability.42  Regardless of the rea-
son for the insured’s failure to pursue an action against its car-
rier, the breaching insurer will realize significant cost avoid-
ance.  Although it would seem no study has been undertaken to 
ascertain the total Unwarranted Defense Costs Savings, re-
gardless of the actual figure, Unwarranted Defense Costs Sav-
ings represents an unfair benefit to the carrier at the expense 
of the insured.  In recognition of this inequity, courts have ap-
plied the Exclusion Bar Rule to provide carriers with an incen-
tive to honor their Defense Duty by affording insureds this 
benefit of the bargain of their policy.43 
 
 b.  Contract Principles and the Exclusion Bar Rule 
 
 i.  Traditional Contract Enforcement Consideration and 
the Application of the Compensatory Damages Principle 
 
In addition to the argument that damage awards for a Pre-
Exclusion Resolution Insurer’s Breach of its defense duty are 
consistent with the Compensatory Damages Principle, tradi-
tional contract principles have been cited in support of the Ex-
clusion Bar Rule.44  The central role that the Defense Duty 
                                                          
42 Although there appears to be no study that explores this issue, this circum-
stance that insureds will not pursue breaches of the Defense Duty is suggest-
ed by statutes such as New York Insurance L. § 3420, which permits a direct 
cause of action by the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit against the carrier.  
The frequency of the employment of this statute, at least indirectly, suggests 
that insureds have less of an incentive to pursue claims in their own right 
than do third party plaintiffs, whether due to financial inability to do so, lack 
of knowledge, lack of motivation, or a combination of these factors. 
43 See BP Air Conditioning Corp., 821 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
44 See Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 
21, 26 (Conn. 1967) (“The defendant, after breaking the contract by its 
unqualified refusal to defend, should not thereafter be permitted to seek the 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
  
2015 CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS  229 
plays in insurance policies has long been recognized. In the 
case of St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co.,45 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined that an 
insurer’s refusal to defend a policyholder without justification 
“cut at the very root of the mutual obligation” between the in-
surer and its policyholder.46 
Insofar as the Defense Duty involves the provision of ser-
vices, its breach implicates well-settled contract jurisprudence 
that permits the granting of exceptional relief47 against the 
party dishonoring its promise to perform, where the services 
involved are extraordinary.  While the performance of services 
under the Defense Clause may not be unique, those to be pro-
vided are, unquestionably, special.  In the discharge of its De-
fense Duty, a carrier can take advantage of its experience in 
the defending of similar claims, its statistical analyses of 
claims data, and its special expertise arising from its back-
ground and special skills that provide the carrier with insight 
into the best defense approach.  These advantages are accom-
panied by the insurer’s control of an apparatus that is suited 
for the defense of such claims and the carrier’s financial ability 
to retain competent outside counsel to defend litigation against 
the insured. 
                                                                                                                                  
protection of that contract in avoidance of its indemnity provisions.”); Emp’rs 
Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135 (Ill. 1999) 
(“[A]n insurer’s duty to defend under a liability insurance policy is so 
fundamental an obligation that a breach of that duty constitutes a 
repudiation of the contract.”).  
45 St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173 
(1906). 
46 Id. at 181. 
47 For example, where rendering of services is the subject of a contract, the 
party promising their performance may be required by injunction to fulfill the 
contractual obligation.  Insurance carriers are the subject of such injunctions 
issued in exercise of courts’ equity powers.  See Emons Indus., Inc. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 1289, 1291-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imposing prelimi-
nary injunction requiring, inter alia, that insurer continue to pay insured’s 
defense costs).  Clearly courts recognize the need for awarding more 
expansive remedies in cases including the breach of the promise of services.  
See Am. Broad. Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367 (N.Y. 1981) (“[W]here an 
employee refuses to render services to an employer in violation of an existing 
contract, and the services are unique or extraordinary, an injunction may is-
sue to prevent the employee from furnishing those services to another person 
for the duration of the contract.”). 
15
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Furthermore, in the defense of claims, the superior posi-
tion of the carrier in relation to the insured is a circumstance 
that results in the insured’s dependency upon the insurer. 
While sometimes stopping short of classifying the relationship 
of an insurer and an insured as fiduciary in nature,48 decisions 
have noted such dependency, leading to treatment of certain 
aspects of the insurer/insured relationship as similar to that 
arising between principal and agent.49  An illustration of this 
treatment is seen in the application of the bad faith rule to car-
riers.  The failure of a carrier to settle claims against an in-
sured within policy limits when doing so is prudent, to use its 
resources to investigate claims, or to oversee their proper han-
dling have each led to determinations that the insurer has 
failed to place an insured’s interests on at least an equal foot-
ing with its own.50  As a consequence, the carrier may be found 
liable for bad faith, exposing it to liability beyond the limits of 
the policy.51 
Because an Insurer’s Breach involves the carrier’s failure 
to provide special services where the Favored Insurer Approach 
Costs exceed Disfavored Insurer Approach Costs, such breach 
has similarities to bad faith, because the carrier chooses its 
own economic interests over those of its insured, irresponsibly 
exposing the insured to risk.  In cases of both bad faith and an 
                                                          
48 See, e.g., Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487, 492 (Cal. 
2001) (“The insurer-insured relationship, however, is not a true ‘fiduciary 
relationship’ in the same sense as the relationship between trustee and 
beneficiary, or attorney and client.”). 
49 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995) 
(“Under liability policies, however, insurance companies took on the 
obligation of defending the insured, which, in turn, made insureds dependent 
on the acts of the insurers.”); Vu, 33 P.3d at 492 (insurer-insured relationship 
is “often characterized by unequal bargaining power in which the insured 
must depend on the good faith and performance of the insurer.”) 
50 See Aecon Bldgs., Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236-37 
(W.D. Wash. 2008) (failure to investigate); Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 
697 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1998) (failure to settle). 
51 See, e.g., Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 26-28 
(N.Y. 1993). Some courts have treated bad faith as a breach of contract by the 
carrier, while others have viewed it as an independent tort. See State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Alaska 1989). Either 
way, it is a reflection of the importance of the carrier’s Defense Duty or 
Indemnity Duty, and illustrates how the breach of either of these duties can 
affect remedies for the breach of the Defense Duty. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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Insurer’s Breach, the insured is dependent on the carrier, and 
this circumstance imposes a heightened responsibility to the 
insured.  In turn, this elevated level of obligation influences the 
consequences of an Insurer’s Breach. 
Both bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty have been 
grounds for at least modifying the application of the Compen-
satory Damages Principle.  In the case of bad faith, the Com-
pensatory Damages Principle does not stand in the way of an 
award of damages beyond the policy limits.  This is because bad 
faith is treated more in the nature of a tort than contract, alt-
hough tort theory still requires proof that “but for” the carrier’s 
bad faith, the insured would not have suffered a loss beyond 
policy limits.  In the context of breach of fiduciary duty, alt-
hough damages are ordinarily still dependent upon evidence of 
proximate cause,52 greater flexibility is afforded the plaintiff.  
For example, the Compensatory Damages Principle may be 
modified so that the measure of damages is the wrongdoer’s 
profit, not the injury to the plaintiff against whom the breach 
of fiduciary duty has occurred.53  Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed below, proof of damages may be relaxed. 
Efforts to avoid the Compensatory Damages Principle, 
though unnecessary as discussed above, have led to judicial 
distinctions between an Insurer’s Breach and other kinds of 
contractual breaches.  As noted above, in recognition of the im-
portance of the Defense Duty, its breach has been character-
ized as depriving the insured of the benefit of its bargain (“In-
sured Defense Clause Argument”).  An Insurer’s Breach is 
treated as so significant as to constitute a repudiation of the 
insurance policy,54 which has been held to preclude the carrier 
from citing any policy exclusion in defense of its Defense Duty 
Breach.55 
Turning to the argument that the Exclusion Bar Rule pro-
vides a “windfall” to the insured in the form of insurance cover-
age to which an insured is not entitled, there is no debate that 
the Compensatory Damages Principle is intended to avoid 
                                                          
52 E.g., Janowiak v. Tiesi, 932 N.E.2d 569, 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Greenberg 
v. Joffee, 824 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (App. Div. 2006). 
53 See infra p. 234. 
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“windfalls.”  However, the relevant question is whether its ap-
plication to an Insurer’s Breach results in an undesired benefit 
to insurers.  Those arguing that the Exclusion Bar Rule confers 
a windfall on insureds do not consider, first, the detriment to 
any given insured by virtue of damages from an Insurer’s 
Breach Pre-Exclusion Resolution, and second, the benefit the 
carrier realizes through Unwarranted Defense Costs Savings.  
Furthermore, disgorgement of Unwarranted Defense Costs 
Savings should be considered in the context of aggregate un-
warranted savings to carriers, so that the Exclusion Bar Rule 
should be viewed as serving a purpose similar to exemplary 
damages.  By enabling the disgorgement of Unwarranted De-
fense Costs Savings, both exemplary damages and the Exclu-
sion Bar Rule discourage socially undesirable behavior by im-
posing damages that are not restricted by the Compensatory 
Damages Principle.56 
 
 ii.  Judicial Constructs That Are Cited in Support of the 
Exclusion Bar Rule But Are Unpersuasive 
Courts seeking a vehicle to justify applying the Exclusion 
Bar Rule have turned to three related judicial constructs, each 
based upon the importance of the Defense Duty, in support of 
arguments that the Exclusion Bar Rule should be applied.  The 
first construct is the doctrine of estoppel.  Estoppel is employed 
where an insurer breaches its duty to defend; the insurer is 
then estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage.57 
The problem with this doctrine, as applied to the Exclusion 
Bar Rule, is that while the insurer has promised a defense to 
the insured, the breach of this promise does not, in and of itself, 
give rise to losses beyond the insured’s defense costs.  Estoppel 
is used to prevent a litigant from asserting a defense based on 
a situation in which such litigant has misled another to the 
other’s disadvantage.58  Estoppel is limited to “filling in gaps” 
in proof of an existing claim, not the creation of a new remedy. 
                                                          
56 Though as noted above, the Exclusion Bar Rule is not incompatible with 
the Compensatory Damages Principle.  See discussion, supra pp. 8-10. 
57 See, e.g., Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 708 N.E.2d at 1134-35; Pulte Home Corp. 
v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 647 S.E.2d 614, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
58 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Hunter, 597 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (es-
toppel from invoking statute of limitations). 
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A related and overlapping basis for applying the Exclusion 
Bar Rule is the materiality of the breach, which has been cited 
as a basis for barring consideration of any exclusions if there is 
an Insurer’s Breach.59  In essence, this argument treats the 
raising of an insurer defense based on a policy exclusion as a 
dependent covenant requiring compliance with the Defense 
Duty.  However, traditional contract jurisprudence requires 
that the agreement between the parties articulate this depend-
ency,60 or that the breach of the policy in question prevent per-
formance by the non-breaching party.61  Neither of these fac-
tors is present in cases of relying upon materiality in support of 
the Exclusion Bar Rule. 
A third proffered basis for applying the Exclusion Bar Rule 
is to treat an Insurer’s Breach as a violation of its fiduciary du-
ty,62 although this characterization can certainly be chal-
lenged.63  In the context of a fiduciary relationship, an agent 
who has been able to seize personally and misappropriate an 
opportunity belonging to the principal may be liable.  Even 
where there is no proof that the opportunity could have been 
utilized by the principal, the agent may be liable to the princi-
pal for damages.64  An example of this would be when the prin-
cipal was financially unable to, or for other reasons unwilling 
to undertake, the corporate opportunity that the agent utilizes 
for the latter’s benefit.65  What the treatment of damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty adds in support of the Exclusion Bar 
Rule is the notion that the remedy for the breach should be 
flexible and not limited to compensatory damages. 
                                                          
59 See Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 
21, 26 (Conn. 1967). 
60 See Davis v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 748 S.E.2d 762, 768 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2013). 
61 See Heyliger v. Tune-Time Fashions, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (App. Div. 
1972) (“[A] party who prevents his adversary from performing a condition 
may not rely on such failure to excuse his own non-performance.”). 
62 See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 462 
N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (App. Div. 1983) (finding fiduciary relationship between 
insurer and insured). 
63 See Koger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“[N]o fiduciary duty generally exists between insurer and insured.”). 
64 Foley v. D’Agostino, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 129 (App. Div. 1964); Durfee v. Dur-
fee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 530 (Mass. 1948). 
65 Foley, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 129; Durfee, 80 N.E.2d at 530. 
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Applied to an Insurer’s Breach, flexibility on the basis of 
the special relationship between the insurer and the insured is 
also invited by the analysis that arises when considering dam-
ages for Pre-Exclusion Resolution Insurer’s Breach.  The ar-
gument is that at the time of the breach, an opportunity to de-
feat the claim through the carrier’s expertise was lost by virtue 
of the Insurer’s Breach, which – because of its nature as a fidu-
ciary, which promises to provide extraordinary services – justi-
fies a creative solution.  The profits realized by a fiduciary 
through defalcation of duty are analogous to profits realized by 
a carrier in the form of Unwarranted Defense Costs Savings.  
In both cases, there is the loss of an opportunity that is difficult 
to quantify but which results from the wrongdoing of a party 
that is entrusted with the protection of the injured party’s in-
terests, resulting in a gain by the former and an inchoate loss 
to the latter.  In such situations, disgorgement has been im-
posed upon the wrongdoer as a remedy for breaching its duty.  
This approach discourages a Disfavored Insurers Approach 
while resolving doubts as to actual damages in favor of the 
principal. 
There is no question that damages for Insurer’s Pre-
Exclusion Resolution Breach are not easily proven.  However, 
victims are often given great latitude in damage calculations, 
particularly where the wrongdoer has a fiduciary duty to the 
victim, or at least has the ability to avoid the injury in the first 
instance, and the wrongdoer nevertheless consciously engages 
in conduct that may lead to the subject damage.  The wrongdo-
ing in question may involve the dishonor of contract provisions, 
such as the Defense Clause, or judicially crafted theories of lia-
bility, such as misappropriation of business opportunity.  In the 
case of the Exclusion Bar Rule, application is also supported by 
considerations of the efficient administration of the courts 
through adherence to judicial constructs.  Before turning to 
this topic, it is worth noting that contract principles are not the 
exclusive ground upon which the Exclusion Bar Rule can be 
applied. 
 
 iii.  Judicial Conventions and Procedural Rules 
 
Putting aside the jurisprudence concerning damages for 
breach of contract or fiduciary duty, the question arises:  
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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should the courts fashion a judicial construct which provides 
that a carrier refusing to follow a Favored Insurers Approach 
loses the ability to raise any exclusion that the carrier might 
otherwise be able to assert in a suit against the carrier for in-
demnity?  This question raises the threshold issue of the extent 
to which courts are permitted to craft procedural rules that de-
termine substantive rights.  The answer depends upon the re-
lationship between such substantive rights and judicial control 
of the administration of cases through judicial constructs and 
procedural rules.66 
In furtherance of their ability to administer cases before 
them, judges have considerable latitude in establishing the 
procedures that should be followed by litigants, and the conse-
quences that result from the failure to follow these proce-
dures.67  Those consequences can be outcome determinative of 
litigants’ claims and defenses.68  For example, where litigants 
have failed to follow court-approved steps in the pursuit of 
court cases, or to pursue diligently their rights or obligations in 
the course of litigation, sanctions may be imposed, including 
preclusion and dismissal of the offending party’s claim or de-
fense, often without regard for the merits.69  These measures 
are taken to promote the integrity of procedures in cases that 
are proceeding through the judicial system, e.g., the preserva-
tion of evidence when there is the possibility that it is relevant 
to potential or pending litigation.  In cases where procedural 
violations lead to loss of substantive rights, the judicial need to 
maintain the orderly progress of pending cases takes prece-
dence over the underlying merit of the case or defense.  Though 
dismissal of cases or defenses based on violation of procedural 
rules or judicial constructs has been called drastic, and has of-
                                                          
66 “Procedural rule,” defined broadly, is a rule that does not directly relate to 
the merits of the case. 
67 See, e.g., In re G.G., 92 A.3d 648, 651 (N.H. 2014) (“[T]he trial court has in-
herent power to control every aspect of the proceeding before it. For this rea-
son, a trial judge has the authority to determine the manner and procedure 
by which a case will be tried, except where limited by statute, court rule, or 
constitutional fiat.”)  
68 See, e.g., Youni Gems Corp. v. Bassco Creations Inc., 896 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 
(App. Div. 2010) (affirming striking of defendants’ answer and counterclaim 
for willful failure to comply with court’s discovery order), dismissing appeal, 
936 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 2010). 
69 See id. 
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ten been the last resort following warnings and sometimes 
fines, when this sanction is needed to maintain the credibility 
of the court’s directives and rules, it is not forestalled by the 
need to prove with precision, or sometimes at all, the underly-
ing harm caused by the breach of the rule.   
Even where the smooth administration of justice is not a 
factor in imposing an outcome determinative consequence, 
courts may dispose of a claim with prejudice on considerations 
other than merit, such as the dismissal for lack of due diligence 
in commencing a suit for equitable relief.  To illustrate, where 
there has been an unjustifiable delay in bringing a claim for in-
junctive relief,70 the judicially created doctrine of laches may be 
employed to dismiss the case.71  Laches involves a court’s dis-
missal of an action on the basis of lack of diligence in bringing 
suit.72  As with the Favored Insurers Approach, there may be 
no legislation that requires the expeditious commencement of 
an action for equitable relief, but there are serious judicial con-
sequences for not doing so promptly.73 
Similarly, the spoliation rule, another judicial creation, re-
quires that a party that knows, or has reason to believe, that 
litigation will be commenced involving preservable tangible ev-
idence, to maintain such evidence.74  The imposition of the spo-
liation rule can lead to preclusion based upon a presumption 
that the spoliated evidence would have supported the claims of 
the non-spoliating party.  The rule does not require proof that, 
                                                          
70 The remedy for the delay in bringing an action at law is typically codified 
in legislation, and so not within the direct province of the court, although 
courts interpret Statute of Limitations statutes and routinely hold out 
exceptions to them and provide them with the gloss of judicial interpretation. 
71 See, e.g., Carriage House Realty Co. v. Mun. Corp. of Yonkers, 363 N.Y.S.2d 
456, 462-63 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
72 The imposition of the sanction does not necessarily require the court to 
address the merits of the equitable claim prior to dismissal.  See id.  
However, a number of courts have looked at this as a factor in determining to 
dismiss based on laches. See Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 381 P.2d 217, 220 
(Ariz. 1963) (“Unlike the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches is 
properly applied only after a consideration of the circumstances and merits of 
a suit ….”). 
73 See, e.g., Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 131-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (dis-
missing equitable causes of action on laches grounds). 
74 See, e.g., Strong v. City of New York, 973 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156-57 (App. Div. 
2013) (erasure of audiotapes). 
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on the merits, the issue arising from the spoliated evidence 
would have been conclusively resolved in favor of the non-
spoliating party; rather, the merits may be conclusively re-
solved upon the application of the spoliation rule itself in favor 
of the non-spoliating party.75  The spoliation rule is one of prac-
ticality, balancing the relative burdens and consequences of 
applying the rules.76  With the evidence destroyed, there may 
be no ability to determine how the spoliated evidence would af-
fect the outcome of the litigation, only that it might have such 
effect. 
As with the Exclusion Bar Rule’s application to the issue of 
the possibility that an insured would prevail in the Underlying 
Action, doubt is resolved against the offending party in many 
spoliation cases because it is within the party’s control to pre-
vent spoliation.77  The difficulty in proving proximate cause is 
resolved against the wrongdoer as a means of discouraging un-
desirable conduct through conclusively shifting burdens of 
proof where the proof may be difficult or impossible.78 
Prejudice is an issue that often arises both in the applica-
tion of both the spoliation rule and the Exclusion Bar Rule.  
                                                          
75 However, proof may be required that the spoliated evidence is relevant to 
the issue that is subject to disposal, and that the spoliated evidence might 
potentially affect the outcome of the issues to be resolved against the 
offending party. See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 844 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(prejudice is required element for imposition of spoliation sanctions). 
76 See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 522 (D. Md. 
2010) (“[T]he scope of preservation should somehow be proportional to the 
amount in controversy and the costs and burdens of preservation.”) (quoting 
Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-
Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 405 (2008)); see 
also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 519-21 (Cal. 
1998) (declining to recognize independent tort for spoliation of evidence 
where, inter alia, “The risk of erroneous spoliation liability could also impose 
indirect costs by causing persons or entities to take extraordinary measures 
to preserve for an indefinite period documents and things of no apparent 
value solely to avoid the possibility of spoliation liability if years later those 
items turn out to have some potential relevance to future litigation.”). 
77 See, e.g., Peschel v. City of Missoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143-48 (D. 
Mont. 2009) (ordering, in response to spoliation of video recording taken by 
police, a finding that it is established that officers used unreasonable force to 
effect arrest). 
78 See id. at 1147 (noting that the spoliated video recording “constituted the 
best evidence of what occurred during the course of the arrest.”). 
23
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The former rule generally requires prejudice in the form of at 
least the loss of the opportunity to prove that the spoliated evi-
dence would support the non-spoliating party’s position.  While 
the Exclusion Bar Rule prevents the carrier from proving that 
an exclusion would have avoided coverage, which carriers ar-
gue is prejudicial to their rights under the policy, the flaw in 
this carrier argument is carriers’ failure to factor in the preju-
dice to the insured of the Insurer’s Breach Pre-Exclusion Reso-
lution.  As discussed above, this issue turns upon the possibil-
ity that a carrier could have, but failed, to provide a defense 
that might have resulted in a determination in the Underlying 
Action favorable to the insured. 
The spoliation rule has been applied by courts to the de-
struction of evidence occurring both before and after the com-
mencement of suit, although spoliation is certainly treated with 
far less tolerance if it occurs after commencement of a lawsuit.  
Before the commencement of litigation, imprudent behavior in 
the destruction of the relevant evidence leads to the application 
of the spoliation rule because the party destroying the evidence 
should reasonably anticipate the commencement of litigation in 
which such evidence would be relevant.79 
Similarly, the Exclusion Bar Rule is implicated by acts and 
omissions that occur before the commencement of the Underly-
ing Action, or during its prosecution, when the carrier refuses 
to provide, or to continue to provide, for the defense of an in-
sured, thereby breaching its Defense Duty.  The breach of the 
Defense Duty is typically the product of a calculated decision 
not to defend in the Underlying Action for economic reasons, 
and exposes the abandoned insured to liability in the Underly-
ing Action.  Thereafter, the Exclusion Bar Rule is applied to an 
indemnity action against the insurer, thereby discouraging car-
riers from taking a Disfavored Insurers Approach and relieving 
the insured of the burden of proving the damages resulting 
from the Insurer’s Breach.80 
                                                          
79 See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 288 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (“[O]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it has a duty to sus-
pend, as to documents that may be relevant to the anticipated litigation, any 
routine document purging system that might be in effect; failure to do so con-
stitutes spoliation.”). 
80 See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal. 1966) (holding insurer 
who wrongfully refused to defend to be responsible for entire judgment where 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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III. The Role of Fairness 
 
The issue of the fairness of the Exclusion Bar Rule can be 
dealt with in a framework that takes into account:  (1) the bur-
den to the insurer of pursuing a Favored Insurers Approach; (2) 
the rights and the reasonable expectations of the insured; (3) 
the equities that are involved in determining whether an in-
surer or insured should bear the consequences of the uncer-
tainty of damages caused by a Pre-Exclusion Resolution Breach 
(“Balancing of Interests Analysis”); and (4) public policy. 
 
A. The Carriers’ Burden of Proving a Favored Insurers Ap-
proach 
Carriers argue that the Exclusion Bar Rule is unfair be-
cause it results in “automatic indemnity.”81  However, this ar-
gument is badly flawed.  Indemnity is not “automatic,” because 
the carrier can bring a declaratory judgment action or defend 
under a reservation of rights.82  Rather, the application of the 
Exclusion Bar Rule follows a conscious decision by the carrier 
to pursue a Disfavored Insurer Approach.  However, the sub-
ject does raise the question of what burden a carrier must as-
sume in order to avoid the consequences of the Exclusion Bar 
Rule.  In a number of jurisdictions that follow the Exclusion 
Bar Rule, the carrier has the option of pursuing a Favored In-
surers Approach.83 
                                                                                                                                  
insured otherwise would face an “impossible burden” in proving the extent of 
the loss caused by the insurer’s breach). 
81 See Brief for Complex Ins. Claims Litig. Ass’n & Am. Ins. Ass’n, as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant-Respondent, K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. 
Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 6 N.E.3d 1117 (N.Y. 2014), 2013 WL 
6924836 at 19-22, 24, & 26-27. 
82 See, e.g., Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 
1122, 1134-35 (Ill. 1999). 
83 See, e.g., Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 993 
(Conn. 2013) (insurer could have defended under a reservation of rights); 
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 708 N.E.2d 1122 (insurer could have brought a de-
claratory judgment action or defended under a reservation of rights); Radke 
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (insur-
er may enter into a non-waiver agreement with insured in which insurer 
agrees to defend and insured acknowledges the insurer’s right to contest cov-
erage, insurer may request bifurcated trial or a declaratory judgment so that 
25
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As applied to carriers, the burden of following a Favored 
Insurers Approach includes the expense of defending the in-
sured Pre-Exclusion Resolution and that of initiating litigation 
in the form of declaratory judgment action.  Where the exclu-
sion is valid, carriers argue that such costs are not their re-
sponsibility because there is no coverage.  However, prior to the 
resolution of the purported exclusion, the carrier is under a du-
ty to incur these costs in any event, which may in fact be sub-
stantial, but are no greater than the law requires.84  Because 
the carrier has received payments in the form of litigation in-
surance, carriers are not prejudiced by resolving the issue of 
any exclusions while providing a defense.85  This is the burden 
that the carrier has assumed when drafting broad Defense 
Clauses in order to control litigation against the insured. 
 
B.  The Insured’s Interests in Pre-Exclusion Resolution 
Turning to the insured’s interests, there is the expectation 
that the carrier will satisfy its Defense Duty until there is an 
Exclusion Resolution.86  As discussed above, the insured’s ex-
pectation arises not only from the breadth of the Defense 
Clause, but from the insurer’s presumed knowledge of the law 
that requires the carrier to defend until the issue of coverage is 
resolved, and also upon the insured’s payment of premiums.87 
                                                                                                                                  
the coverage issue may be resolved before the liability and damage issues, or 
insurer may file a reservation of rights which permits the insured to pursue 
his own defense not subject to the insurer’s control, but insurer agrees to pay 
for the legal fees incurred). 
84 See El-Com Hardware, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
670, 679 (Ct. App. 2001) (duty to defend continues until insurer establishes 
there is no potential for coverage). 
85 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 
444 (N.Y. 1985) (“The insured’s right to representation and the insurer’s cor-
relative duty to defend suits, however groundless, false or fraudulent, are in a 
sense ‘litigation insurance’ expressly provided by the insurance contract.”). 
86 See El-Com Hardware, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679 (duty to defend con-
tinues until insurer establishes there is no potential for coverage). 
87 See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 
1993) (“The insured’s desire to secure the right to call on the insurer’s superi-
or resources for the defense of third party claims is, in all likelihood, typically 
as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as is the wish to obtain 
indemnity for possible liability.”). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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The carrier itself is well aware of the insured’s expecta-
tions, of the carrier’s own role in rendering the insured vulner-
able, and of the carrier’s own superior ability to defend claims 
compared to that of the insured.88  Depriving the insured of the 
benefit of having litigation insurance at the time when the in-
sured needs that purchased protection causes hardship to the 
insured.89  These circumstances and the carrier’s knowledge of 
the insured’s position weigh heavily in favor of the insured in 
the Balancing of Interests Analysis.  One’s knowledge of anoth-
er’s reliance on him may give rise to a heightened duty to that 
party.  As the court held in Cahaly v. Benistar Property Ex-
change Trust Co.,90 “[w]here a plaintiff reposes trust and confi-
dence in the defendant, and the defendant knows of the plain-
tiff’s reliance on him, a fiduciary duty may be created.”91 
 
C. The Equities Involved in Imposing the Exclusion Bar Rule  
 
 1.  The Role of the Degree of the Carrier’s Culpability 
 
A number of factors, including Insurer’s Approach Varia-
bles, are germane to determining the degree of the culpability 
associated with an Insurer’s Breach.  Where the Defense Duty 
is clear from the pleading, issues raised by the exclusion are 
patently inapplicable, so the insurer does not even have a col-
orable excuse for failing to defend,92 and the Insurer’s Breach 
                                                          
88 MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 652 F.3d 152, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging 
that insureds “may lack the expertise and experience of an insurer ….”). 
89 See Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 529 n.14 (Ct. App. 
1995) (“An insured obtains liability insurance in substantial part in order to 
be protected against the trauma and financial hardship of litigation. If the 
courts did not impose an immediate defense obligation upon a showing of a 
‘potential for coverage,’ thereby relieving the insured from the burden of 
financing his own defense and then having to sue the insurer for 
reimbursement, the premiums paid by the insured would purchase nothing 
more than a lawsuit.”). 
90 See Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 864 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2007). 
91 Id. at 560. 
92 For example, in K Investment Group, LLC v. American Guarantee Liability 
& Insurance Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 2012), an intermediate appel-
late court observed that the pleading in the Underlying Action rendered the 
exclusions upon which the carrier relied “patently inapplicable.” Id. at 141.  
This was the case because the policy’s definition of “claim” was from the per-
27
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evinces a high degree of culpability.  In contrast, instances 
where the Insurer’s Breach concerns a claim that falls entirely 
within the exclusion, or where the applicable exclusion involves 
some level of fault by the insured, the Insurer’s Breach is more 
defensible. 
 
 2.  The Placement of the Burden 
 
Finally, there is the issue of who should bear the burden 
created by the uncertainty of damages caused by the carrier’s 
Pre-Exclusion Resolution breach.93  The Compensatory Damag-
es Principle would impose such damages upon the insured be-
cause the burden of showing that the breach caused damage is 
part of the insured’s prima facie case against the carrier.  How-
ever, the cases are legion which hold that a party that breaches 
                                                                                                                                  
spective of the claimants in the Underlying Action, and in the cited case, the 
pleadings in the Underlying Action asserted causes of action that did not rely 
on facts that would have made the claims subject to the exclusions, i.e., in the 
Underlying Action, it was alleged that the insured was the claimants’ attor-
ney and provided services to the claimants.  The exclusions were, therefore, 
inapplicable, and the carrier could have challenged the allegations in the 
complaint in the Underlying Action.  The applicability of the exclusions was 
also traversable, i.e., it could have been contested whether the insured was 
not the claimants’ attorney.  The Court of Appeals, in K2 Investment Group, 
LLC, disagreed with the intermediate appellate court, finding an issue of fact 
as to the applicability of the subject exclusions.  K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. 
Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 6 N.E.3d 1117, 1120-21 (N.Y. 2014).  In K2 In-
vestment Group, LLC, the Court indicated that if the malpractice resulted 
from a conflict between the insured’s role as attorney for the claimants and 
his role as a principal of the company which borrowed money from the claim-
ants that ultimately was not repaid, then the exclusions applied.  See id. at 
1121. 
93 The desire to avoid uncertainty is also a factor in those jurisdictions where 
either the Exclusion Survival Rule or the Exclusion Bar Rule represents 
longstanding precedent. However, if compelling reasons exist, courts will de-
part from stare decisis. See Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium, Inc. v. 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he values 
of stability and judicial economy promoted by stare decisis must yield when 
reason and fairness so compels.”); People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 
(N.Y. 1990) (“Although a court should be slow to overrule its precedents, 
there is little reason to avoid doing so when persuaded by the ‘lessons of ex-
perience and the force of better reasoning.’”) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); State ex 
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a duty will bear the consequences of any resulting uncertainty 
in the calculation of damages.94 
Assessing whether the Exclusion Bar Rule imposes dispro-
portionate consequences for the breach of an insurer’s Defense 
Duty requires consideration of the nature of the relationship 
between the insured and the insurer.  As has been touched up-
on above, as to at least some aspects of this relationship, the 
insurer has been treated as having a fiduciary duty to the in-
sured.95  Although no decisions appear to directly base the em-
ployment of the Exclusion Bar Rule upon this confidential sta-
tus, some courts have cited the existence of a fiduciary rela-
relationship to avoid the Compensatory Damages Principle.  
For example, as previously discussed, where a fiduciary misap-
propriates a corporate opportunity, courts have held that the 
damages to the company are not what the company lost, but 
what the fiduciary gained.96  As has also been argued,97 apply-
ing this reasoning to insurers that have breached their Defense 
Duty, the Exclusion Bar Rule can be used to justify disgorge-
ment of costs saved by insurers as a result of breaches of their 
duty to defend. 
 
 3.  Public Policy 
 
Two public policy considerations are relevant to the appli-
cation of the Exclusion Bar Rule.  First, there is the benefit de-
rived from courts’ protection of the sanctity of contracts, in fur-
therance of which courts have acted to discourage antisocial 
conduct, such as with bad faith, that is motivated by economic 
                                                          
94 See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 
926 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying New York law); Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer 
Co., 160 P.2d 804, 813 (Cal. 1945); Eden United, Inc. v. Short, 653 N.E.2d 
126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
95 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1995). 
96 See Epstein Eng’g P.C. v. Cataldo, 955 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (App. Div. 2012) 
(“A faithless servant must account not only for profits attributable to clients 
poached from the principal, but for all profits ascribable to the wrongful 
diversion of business.”). 
97 See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Immunex Corp., 297 P.3d 688, 694 (Wash. 2013) 
(“[W]hen an insurer declines to defend altogether, it saves money on legal 
fees but assumes the risk it may have breached its duty to defend or 
committed bad faith.”). 
29
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factors that have led to breaches of contract.98  In promoting 
the integrity of contracts, courts have created judicial con-
structs, such as the Exclusion Bar Rule, to serve as disincen-
tives from the pursuit of conduct that is contrary to social poli-
cy, e.g., a Disfavored Insurers Approach.99  The disincentive 
created by the Exclusion Bar Rule is the economic consequenc-
es associated with the carrier’s loss of the ability to raise exclu-
sions when a carrier has pursued a Disfavored Insurers Ap-
proach. 
The second policy consideration is judicial economy.  In K2 
I it was observed that allowing the raising of exclusions after 
the breach of the Defense Clause would result in a multiplicity 
of lawsuits.100  Carriers, on the other hand, have argued that 
the Exclusion Bar Rule actually promotes litigation because 
the carriers would be forced to bring declaratory judgment ac-
tions in every case.101  However, since declaratory judgment ac-
tions are a Favored Insurers Approach, litigation leading to the 
resolution of exclusions before the abandonment of the insured 
is encouraged.  Furthermore, it is entirely possible that, in a 
number of cases, the issue of exclusions can be addressed in the 
Underlying Action – for example, whether the exclusion applies 
and whether and to what extent injury is caused, under which 
circumstances judicial economy would be furthered by requir-
ing the carrier to raise the issue earlier.102 
 
                                                          
98 See, e.g., Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 26-28 
(N.Y. 1993) (setting standard for bad faith breach of insurance contract). 
99 See, e.g., Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 
1122, 1134-35 (Ill. 1999). 
100 See K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 
1249, 1254 (N.Y. 2013) (stating that permitting insurers to raise exclusions 
after wrongfully refusing to defend “would promote unnecessary and wasteful 
litigation ….”). 
101 See Brief for N.Y. Ins. Ass’n, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent at 27-28, K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. 
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 6 N.E.3d 1117 (N.Y. 2014). 
102 In K2, this was the case.  There the question of whether the insured was 
attorney for K2 Investment Group, LLC and ATAS Management Group, LLC, 
and whether a third party’s claims against the insured were based upon the 
insured’s providing services to a company the insured controlled or were 
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IV. 
 
The K2 decisions touch upon many of the issues that relate 
to the consequences of the carrier’s breach of its Defense Duty.  
The underlying facts of the case are somewhat involved.  The 
insured was covered by a legal malpractice liability policy that 
contained exclusions for “claims” that were “based upon or aris-
ing out of, in whole or in part . . . the alleged acts or omissions 
by any Insured, . . . for any business enterprise . . . in which 
any Insured has a Controlling Interest,”103 where “Controlling 
Interest” is defined as ten percent (10%) or greater ownership 
in an entity,104 or were “based upon or arising out of, in whole 
or in part . . . the insured’s capacity or status as an officer, di-
rector, partner . . . , shareholder, manager . . . of a business en-
terprise, charitable organization or pension, welfare, profit 
sharing, mutual or investment fund or trust.”105  The insured, 
who was a member and principal of a company called Goldan, 
LLC (“Goldan”) which borrowed money from the third-party 
claimants, K2 Investment Group, LLC and ATAS Management 
Group, LLC (collectively, “K2/ATAS”), failed to record mortgag-
es to secure the loans or obtain title insurance for K2/ATAS.  
The insured also signed promissory notes obligating Goldan to 
pay K2/ATAS, and personally guaranteed such notes and 
signed the mortgages on behalf of Goldan.  Goldan defaulted on 
the promissory notes and was placed into bankruptcy.  After 
the default, K2/ATAS commenced suit against the insured, 
Goldan, and the other principal of Goldan. 
Claims asserted against the insured for legal malpractice 
were based exclusively upon the insured’s failure to record the 
mortgages and to obtain title insurance for K2/ATAS.  Initially, 
the insurer retained counsel to defend the insured, but then 
disclaimed and withdrew from its defense of the insured before 
issue was joined.  Eventually, the insured defaulted in the un-
derlying case and assigned his claims against the insurer to 
K2/ATAS, which then commenced an indemnity action against 
the insurer.  In the indemnity action, both the insurer and 
                                                          
103 Joint Record on Appeal at 205 ¶ III(E), K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guaran-
tee & Liab. Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1249 (N.Y. 2013). 
104 Id. at 209 ¶ VI(D)(1). 
105 Id. at 205 ¶ III(D). 
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K2/ATAS moved for summary judgment.  The plenary court 
denied K2/ATAS’s motion for summary judgment on bad faith 
and dismissed such claims, but granted K2/ATAS’s motion for 
summary judgment on their indemnity claims up to the policy 
limits, commenting, “[t]he insurance company had a clear obli-
gation to defend in this case. . . . It decided to risk not defend-
ing it. It made a very bad judgment in my judgment.”106 
Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, 
a three-to-two majority, focusing upon the definition of the 
term “claim,” affirmed and held that the judgment against the 
insured was exclusively based on claims under the policy, and 
that the exclusions relied upon were patently inapplicable.107  
Two dissenting justices reasoned that there was an issue of fact 
as to whether the exclusions applied.108  The insurer appealed, 
as of right, to the New York State Court of Appeals. 
In K2 I, the Court of Appeals held that, based upon the 
abandonment of the insured by the insurer, the Exclusion Bar 
Rule should be applied, which application deprived the insurer 
of the right to raise exclusions. Relying on a prior decision in 
Lang v. Hanover Insurance Co.109 and expanding the tradition-
al interpretation of this decision, the Court held where a dis-
claimer has been made in breach of the Defense Duty, the car-
rier is barred from raising exclusions in an indemnity action.110  
This treatment of the disclaimer provided the carrier with the 
incentive to follow a Favored Insurer Approach, viz., to resolve 
issues relating to the exclusion while defending the insured.  It 
also provided the insured with the benefit of the bargain, but 
never reached the ground upon which the First Department 
holding was based. 
However, the Court granted reargument and, stating that 
there was much to be said for either side of the issue, decided 
                                                          
106 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. 
Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., Index No. 117902/2009 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
June 9, 2010) (per JHO Ira Gammerman). 
107 K Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 139, 
141-42 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d, 993 N.E.2d 1249 (N.Y. 2013), and rev’d in part 
on reargument, 6 N.E.3d 1117 (N.Y. 2014). 
108 Id. at 145-46 (Andrias, J., dissenting). 
109 Lang v. Hanover Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 2004).  
110 K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1249, 
1253-54 (N.Y. 2013). 
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that stare decisis should be followed and the Exclusion Survival 
Rule applied.111  This time the Court of Appeals did reach the 
issues upon which the majority of the Appellate Division found 
in the case in favor of K2/ATAS, but agreed with the minority 
that there was an issue of fact precluding summary judg-
ment.112 
K2 I and K2 II illustrate the struggle that courts face in 
resolving the issue of whether to apply the Exclusion Bar Rule 
or the Exclusion Survival Rule.  However, K2 I does not tackle 
the issues in depth, and K2 II is particularly superficial in its 
treatment of the issues. 
 
V. Proposal 
The author recommends the adoption of the Exclusion Bar 
Rule, with certain qualifications.  The rule is justified by the 
balancing of burdens of insured and insurer, which weighs 
heavily in favor of the insured, as does public policy in favor of 
the integrity of contracts.  Overall fairness, which considers the 
importance of the Defense Clause and the integral part it plays 
in the benefit of the bargain of the insurance contract, supports 
the application of the Exclusion Bar Rule. 
However, there are circumstances when a carrier is justi-
fied in not defending an insured without first bringing a de-
claratory judgment action.  One such circumstance is when the 
claim, as presented to the carrier, falls entirely inside the ex-
clusion.113  Another such circumstance is when it is clear there 
is collusion between the insured and the third party claimant. 
 
VI.  Issues to Investigate 
  
                                                          
111 See K2 Inv. Grp., LLC v. Am. Guarantee Liab. & Ins. Co., 6 N.E.3d 1117, 
1120 (N.Y. 2014). In this case, the case forming the basis for the stare decisis 
was Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 
1985), which had held that when an insurer breached its duty to defend and 
the insured concluded a reasonable settlement with the injured party, the 
insurer was not precluded from raising coverage defenses in arguing it was 
not liable for the settlement amount. See id. at 444. 
112 K2 Inv. Grp., LLC, 6 N.E.3d at 1120-21. 
113 However, this situation would not even trigger a duty to defend; hence, it 
need not be treated as an exception to the Exclusion Bar Rule. 
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Some subjects that are worthy of further investigation are 
how often disclaimers by carriers of the Defense Duty result in 
actions against the carriers; what portion, on average, of a lia-
bility insurance premium is devoted to defense costs, and how 
this portion is calculated; what portion is attributable to Pre-
Exclusion Resolution Defense Costs; whether the requirement, 
in jurisdictions employing the Exclusion Bar Rule, that insur-
ers bring declaratory judgment actions prior to refusing to de-
fend insureds, has the effect of increasing or decreasing the to-
tal number of actions brought; the economic effect on carriers of 
the application of the Exclusion Bar Rule where such rule ap-
plies; and the disparity between success rates for insured de-
fendants in actions in which their carriers defend them, and 
those in actions in which their carriers do not defend them.  
Finally, it would be useful to know, in instances in which an 
Insurer Breach has occurred, what percentage of the insureds 
have brought an action against the insurers. 
The relevance of these subjects should be apparent from 
the preceding discussions.  Whether the answer should affect 
the author’s proposal is doubtful because, as a general proposi-
tion, an award of Pre-Exclusion Resolution Insurer Breach 
Damages is consistent with applicable law, such as the Com-
pensatory Damages Principle, as discussed above.  However, 
supporting arguments, such as those based on Unwarranted 
Defense Costs Savings, would be affected by such investigation. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
The author advocates a rule that would preclude an insur-
er that is confronted with a claim implicating Basic Coverage 
from defending a suit for breaching its Defense Duty prior to 
the resolution of the merits of any exclusion. This rule does not 
offend the Compensatory Damages Principle because the in-
sured has paid premiums for defense in reliance upon the car-
rier’s satisfying this duty. In light of the special relationship 
between the carrier and the insured, the difficulty of determin-
ing damages, and public policy that favors a prompt determina-
tion of coverage issues, when the insurer fails to defend before 
a resolution of the merits of the exclusion, it is appropriate to 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/6
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presume the insured’s damages are equal to any judgment 
against it in the underlying action. 
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